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Redressing the Balance: An Examination of the Scope
First Amendment Protections, Prosecutorial Discretion
and Probable Cause in the Wake of Hartman v. Moore
By Anjoli Terhune*
"If our democracy is devolving into a manipulated nation of
inattentive spectators, we have the responsibility to speak honestly
about our national choices, and to do so even if we feel hesitant or
scared."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you represent a group of individuals whose skills
and expertise have enabled them to recognize that a government
organization's initiative to employ the use of certain technology
could result in widespread inefficiency and induce a substantial and
recurring economic burden upon the government. You have a
decision to make. Do you promulgate your concerns? Or do you
keep quiet knowing that the aforementioned option renders you
vulnerable to the possibility of retaliatory action?
Considering the long-held belief that "the public's best protection
against [potential harms emanating from agencies or companies that
have an affect upon society] is the insider who is willing to speak up
and shed light on her colleague's improprieties," assume that you
decide to publicly voice your concerns.2 Subsequently however,
your concerns over possible retaliation are realized when you are
* J.D. Candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A. Sociology,
Minor Classical Civilization, 2004, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. Paul Loeb, Reclaiming Our Courage: True victory for the right is
impossible as long as we keep fighting, Working for Change, Dec. 18, 2002,
http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?ItemID= 14257.
2. See Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2004).
subjected to criminal charges purporting that you have been involved
in unlawful activities. You have an educated suspicion that those
behind the imposition of the charges are they very same as those
whose initiatives you publicly criticized. You are eventually cleared
of the charges, but left with a tarnished reputation and seriously
questioned credibility. Do you have any recompense for your
decision to inform the public of your opinions other than the personal
knowledge that you did your best to warn the public against a
potential peril to society?
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that your speech is subject to protection, and furthermore, that you
are protected from retaliatory actions taken in response to your
protected speech.
Before you go charging into the courts - constitution in hand -
you must meet additional hurdles imposed by the judiciary. Imagine
after demonstrating: (1) that your speech was constitutionally
protected; (2) the defendant's retaliation was that which would
generally discourage an ordinary person from engaging in similar
speech; and (3) the defendant's actions were motivated against the
public opinion you expressed, you are told that there may be one
more element you need to demonstrate.
The court knows that your personal and professional reputation
suffered from the actions taken against you, that that this could have
detrimental economic effects upon you for years to come and that
you have already demonstrated three other ways in which your rights
were infringed; but they are still debating on whether you be required
to prove one more thing. The question is: should a plaintiff in a
retaliatory prosecution suit be required to plead and prove an absence
of probable cause for pressing the underlying criminal charges in
order to establish a First Amendment violation?
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Hartman v. Moore, the
answer to this question depended upon which circuit the appellate
challenge to the plaintiff's claim was brought in.3
Where retaliatory action takes the form of criminal prosecution,
all circuits have agreed that a plaintiff must illustrate: (1) that they
were engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) the
3. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006); see also Keenan v. Tejeda,
290 F. 3d 252, 258 n.7 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting the split among the circuit courts as
to the exact elements a retaliatory prosecution plaintiff need plead).
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defendant's actions caused them to suffer an injury that would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that
activity; and (3) the defendant's adverse actions were substantially
motivated against the plaintiffs' exercise of constitutionally
protected conduct.4  What the circuits could not agree on was
whether or not a fourth element need be applied.5 A review of the
appellate challenges brought in the Court of Appeals for the Second,
Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh circuits prior to 2006 illustrates that
plaintiffs are required to demonstrate an absence of probable cause in
addition to the three aforementioned elements. 6 Challenges in the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth circuits
meanwhile demonstrate a showing of a lack of probable cause is not
required.7
On April 26, 2006 the Hartman Court settled the ongoing debates
between the circuits. 8 There, the Court concluded that an actionable
violation of the First Amendment arising from retaliatory prosecution
is found only where the plaintiff demonstrates there was no probable
cause for their prosecution. 9
After publicly criticizing the United States Postal Service's
initiative to employ the use of single line rather than multiline
scanners, Williman G. Moore, Jr. - then Chief Executive of
Recognition Equipment Inc. ("REI") - and REI were subjected to
investigations for inappropriate compensation from a public relations
firm, and an improper role in the search for a new Postmaster
General.10  Though these investigations culminated in criminal
4. Tejeda, 290 F.3d at 258.
5. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
6. Tejeda, 290 F.3d at 258.
7. See id. (holding all circuits recognize plaintiffs charging an unlawful
retaliatory criminal prosecution must establish three elements: (1) they were
engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) the defendants' actions caused
them to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) the defendants' adverse actions were
substantially motivated against the plaintiffs' exercise of constitutionally protected
conduct). Id. The requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate an absence of probable
cause is an element considered in addition to the three elements all circuits require
a plaintiff in a retaliatory criminal prosecution case to demonstrate.
8. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265-66.
9. Id. at 266.
10. Id. at 252-55.
charges being brought by the Assistant United States Attorney,
Moore and REI were eventually granted a motion for acquittal."I
Following their acquittal, Moore and REI raised multiple causes
of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.12 The defendants in the
action were the postal inspectors who had investigated Moore and
REI, and the federal prosecutor who had brought the criminal charge
against them.' 3 Among the plaintiffs claims was the allegation that
they had been subject to retaliatory prosecution in violation of their
First Amendment rights.' 4 While several of their other claims were
dismissed, the charge of a First Amendment violation was permitted
to move forward in the district court.15
After both the district court and circuit court of appeals denied
the defendants qualified immunity, the circuit court of appeals
remained divided on the issue of exactly what a plaintiff in a
retaliatory prosecution action must plead and prove. 16 Specifically
they debated over whether or not such a plaintiff need demonstrate a
lack of probable cause for their prosecution.' 7 The court ultimately
held that the elements of a retaliatory prosecution claim should
include proof of a lack of probable cause.18
Hartman is the latest in a long line of Supreme Court precedent
addressing how closely courts will review exercises of prosecutorial
discretion for unconstitutional motives, and what the elements of a
retaliatory prosecution claim should be in light of the Court's
recognition of the broad discretion given to prosecutors. 9 In those
11. Id. at 254 (referencing United States v. Recognition Equip. Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 587, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). The district court found insufficient evidence to
support the claims against Moore and REI. Id. at 266.
12. Id. at 254; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), and 2671-
2680, where the provisions of the Federal Tort Claim Act ("FTCA") can be found.
The FTCA is a legislative scheme whereby civil suits for actions arising out of
negligent acts of agents of the United States are permitted to be brought against the
United States. Id.
13. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 254.
14. Id
15. Id. at 255.
16. Id. at 255-56.
17. Id. at 255.
18. Id. at 265-66.
19. See John Bash, Tomorrow's Argument in Hartman v. Moore, Scotusblog,
Jan. 9, 2006,
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regards, Hartman does not differ from the long line of First
Amendment violation cases preceding it. Where Hartman stands
apart from precedent, however, lies in the fact that it draws a bright
line through what once was an ongoing dispute as to what a plaintiff
needs to plead in a prima facie retaliatory prosecution claim, as the
court resolutely added a fourth element to the previously established
three elements required of such a plaintiff.
20
This note examines the Hartman decision and addresses the legal
and societal implications it carries. Part II of this Note describes the
history of the First Amendment and the underlying structure of
retaliatory prosecution claims prior and up to the Hartman decision. 2'
Part III presents the facts of Hartman.22 Part IV presents and
analyzes the Court's majority and dissenting opinions.23 Part V
assesses the legal and societal impact and significance of the
Hartman Court's decision.24 Part VI concludes this note.25
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances" 26
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/0 1/tomorrows argum_28.
html (discussing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) and United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-66 (1996)).
20. See infa, notes 65 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 21-69 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 90-130 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 131-47 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Though the span of the First Amendment is
inclusive of rights for free press, religion and assembly in addition to free speech,
for the purposes of this note I will restrict its discussion to its applicability in
violations of the free speech guarantee.
On its face, the First Amendment guarantees the people of the
United States freedom to express themselves without the interference
or constraint of Congress.27 Over time the Supreme Court has
interpreted the First Amendment as providing a check not only on
Congress, but the federal government in its entirety.28
Following the 1791 ratification of the Bill of Rights, courts held
fast to the protection of civil liberties it afforded.29
Generally, the First Amendment is considered to prohibit not only
direct limitations on speech, but also adverse government action
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding rights protected by
the First Amendment are not only protected from abridgement by congress, but
also from impairment by the states as well); see also Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 597 (1972). The government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests - especially, his interest in
freedom of speech." Id. at 597.
29. See e.g. City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 1 Cal. 3d 527 (Cal. 1982). "The
right of petition, like the other rights contained in the First Amendment . . . is
accorded 'a paramount and preferred place in our democratic system"' Id. The
Supreme Court has stated that "the rights to assemble peaceably and to petition for
a redress of grievances are among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by
the Bill of Rights. These rights, moreover, are intimately connected, both in origin
and in purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and free
press." Id. (citing A.C.L.U. v. Bd. of Educ., 55 Cal.2d 167, 178 (1961); see also
Mine Workers v. Ill. Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (holding that the First
Amendment would be "a hollow promise if it left government free to destroy or
erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is passed that prohibits
free speech, press, petition, or assembly as such"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945) (holding it violated the constitution to restrain a citizen's rights of
free speech and assembly). .
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on
this Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the
State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption
supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in
our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms
secured by the First Amendment .... [T]hat priority gives these
liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions. And it is the character of the right, not of the
limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice..
• or these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be
justified by clear public interest . . . [t]hese rights rest on fir[m]
foundation.
Id.; see also, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
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against an individual because of their exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. 30 For example, in accord with the First Amendment, the
government may not place conditions on public benefits, including
jobs which penalize applicants for their speech, beliefs, or
association.31
In acknowledgement of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
prohibits states from infringing upon the rights of any American
citizen, many courts have inferred that in addition to Congress, state
and local governments are prohibited from infringing on First
Amendment rights as well.32  Due to the fact that the First
Amendment itself, however, does not expressly provide protection
for those whose rights were violated under state laws and actors, it
was not until eighty years after the ratification of the First
Amendment that a cause of action was firmly extended enabling
30. See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 508 (5th Cir. 1999), supra notes
45-49 and accompanying text.
31. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding
impermissible under the First Amendment the dismissal of a high school teacher
for speaking on "issues of public importance"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
409-10 (1963) (holding that unemployment compensation may not be withheld on
the condition that a person accept Saturday employment contrary to her religious
faith); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (holding that a citizen
cannot be refused a public office for failure to declare his belief in God); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (prohibiting on First Amendment grounds
the limiting of state tax exemptions to only those who take a loyalty oath); cf
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961)
(recognizing that the government cannot deny employment because of previous
membership in a particular political party). This is true even where the person has
no contractual or property right in the benefit withheld. See Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977) (holding that an untenured
public school teacher may not be discharged if he shows that constitutionally
protected conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the decision not to
rehire him and the employer fails to demonstrate that it would have reached the
same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that an untenured teacher's lack of formal contractual
or tenure security in his job was irrelevant to his First Amendment claim that his
employer, a state college, refused to renew his contract because of his protected
speech).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Id.
plaintiffs to recover for First Amendment violations by state actors. 33
This remedy came with the 1871 enaction of Section 1983 of Title 42
of the United States Code.34 Section 1983 ("section 1983") provided
a civil action for the deprivation constitutional rights.35 In light of
the fact that § 1983 was a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, it did
not just protect against violations of the First Amendment, but all
constitutional violations.36 Additionally, section 1983 opened a new
forum for claims of constitutional violations. 3
7
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Ian Forsythe, A Guide to Civil Rights
Liability Under 42 US.C. § 1983: An Overview of Supreme Court and Eleventh
Circuit Precedent, http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm.
("Section 1983 was enacted on April 20, 1871, as a part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.").
34. Forsythe, A Guide to Civil Rights Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 providing:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
§ 1983.
35. See Memphis Cmty Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 315-16 (1986)
(holding compensatory damages are available under a § 1983 action because
"deprivation of constitutional rights.., constitutes compensable injuries").
36. See section 1983 (". . .any rights ... secured by the constitution.
See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10 (1980) (holding "section 1983
authorizes suits against State and local officials based upon Federal statutory as
well as constitutional rights").
37. See Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475 (Wis. 1977) (holding a § 1983 action
may be brought in a state or federal court). In addition to providing a remedy for
constitutional violations inflicted at the hands of federal or local government, some
courts have extended the applicability of § 1983 to apply against private employers
as well. See e.g. Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005). In
Dossett a bank employee sued her employer for conspiring to terminate her
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The comprehensiveness of the protection afforded by the Civil
Rights Act from which § 1983 stems, owes itself in part to the fact
that it was enacted with the intent to "provide a remedy against the
abuses that were being committed in the southern states., 38 Because
the Civil Rights Act provides for a private remedy for violations of
federal law, it has been interpreted by many as creating a species of
tort liability. 3
9
The expansion of First Amendment protection provided by
section 1983 was notably upheld in the landmark 1968 Supreme
Court case Pickering v. Board of Education.40 The Pickering Court
held that it was impermissible under the First Amendment for a high
school teacher to be fired for exercising his right to free speech.4'
The Court explained that terminating one's employment because they
engaged in public speech is a form of retaliation which offends the
employment in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right of free speech
after she spoke out against her local school district in a public meeting. Id. at 944.
The court held "there was no reason to preclude a plaintiff from bringing suit
against a private actor who actively conspired with a public entity to violate
another's Constitutional rights." Id. at 950. Specifically, the court noted that,
"[u]nder section 1983, a plaintiff may establish not only that a private actor caused
the deprivation of constitutional right, but that the private actor willfully
participated with state officials and reached a mutual understanding concerning the
unlawful objective of a conspiracy." Id. at 951.
38. Specifically § 1983 was aimed at those acts carried out by the Ku Klux
Clan; which is why the Civil Rights Act is also referred to as the "Ku Klux Clan
Act." As previously stated, though the expanse of the Civil Rights Act is all
inclusive of constitutional rights, for the purposes of this note I will restrict its
discussion to its applicability in violations of the First Amendment. See also,
Forsythe supra note 33.
39. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986). "42 U.
S. C. § 1983 n8 creates 'a species of tort liability' in favor of persons who are
deprived of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured' to them by the Constitution"
(quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978)). Id.
40. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering a school
teacher was fired after he wrote a letter criticizing the School Board, and the letter
was published in a local newspaper. Id. at 564-65. The School Board claimed the
letter was detrimental to school interests, and terminated Pickering in accord with a
state statute. Id. Pickering claimed that the termination infringed upon his First
Amendment rights to free speech and brought suit against his former employers.
Id. at 565.
41. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565.
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First Amendment because it threatens to inhibit or abridge exercise of
the protected right.42
Pickering firmly established a cause of action for those whose
First Amendment rights had been deprived by retaliatory dismissal or
penalties.4 3  Additionally, it confirmed that such claims could be
brought against not only the federal government and states for the
legislation of laws infringing upon constitutional rights, but also,
under section 1983, against those acting under the color of state
law.44
Retaliatory prosecution cases arising in the wake of Pickering
serve to illustrate the seminal nature of the Pickering decision and its
application of section 1983. 4' For example, the Tenth Circuit
elaborated on the Pickering Court's reasoning in Smith v. Plati.46
There, the court stated that any form of retaliation for one's exercise
of free speech - whether it be prosecution, threatened or actual, bad
faith investigations, or legal harassment - constitutes an infringement
of the First Amendment freedom of speech guarantee for the very
reasons discussed in Pickering.4 7
Following Plati, the court in Colson v. Grohman expatiated on
the reasons why mere retaliation against the exercise of First
Amendment rights should be considered a violation of the
42. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 US 574, 589 (1997) (quoting Pickering, 391
U.S. at 574 ); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597.
43. See infra cases cited in note 58.
44. See cases cited supra notes 3 and 9.
45. See supra notes 38-43.
46. Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2001). In Plati, a cause of action
was brought under section 1983 after the plaintiff launched a website discussing
athletic teams at the University of Colorado at Boulder, and he was allegedly
subsequently subjected to harassment by the University Assistant Athletic Director
for Media Relations in a manner that inhibited his First Amendment rights of free
speech, newsgathering and equal access via retaliatory actions and false arrest. Id.
at 1175-79.
47. Plati, 258 F.3d at 1176 (quoting Worrell v. Henryy, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212
(10th Cir. 2000)); see also Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 22, 36 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The
First Amendment prohibits not only direct limitations on speech but also adverse
government action against an individual because of her exercise of First
Amendment freedoms"); see also Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498 (5th Cir.
1999). "Subjecting an attorney to criminal investigation and prosecution with the
substantial motivation of dissuading him from associating with and representing
clients opposing the IRS would violate the First Amendment." Id. at 508.
693Fall 2007 Redressin2 the Balance
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Constitution.48 In Colson, the plaintiff (an elected official) alleged
that city officials falsely accused her of criminal acts, urged
prosecutors to investigate her, and instigated a recall election against
her because she publicly expressed political views with which they
disagreed.49 Particularly, the Colson court noted that retaliation or
the imposition of any penalty for speech, belief, or other First
Amendment guaranteed freedom is an indirect manner in which one
unlawfully interferes with constitutional rights.5" Colson articulated
that retaliatory actions taken against one for having exercised First
Amendment freedoms have the very effect of chilling the exercise of
those freedoms; and for this reason, such actions, should render the
retaliating person liable for injuries suffered in the wake of their
retaliatory acts.5'
Despite the broadening protection of citizen's rights that was
taking place in the courts following the enactment of sectionl983,
there were still retaliatory actions from which one could not recover:
those instigated by a federal official or agent.52 This was resolved,
however, three years after Pickering in 1971 in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents. 53
48. Colson, 174 F.3d at 508. "[I]f government officials were permitted to
impose serious penalties in retaliation for an individual's speech, then the
government would be able to stymie or inhibit his exercise of rights in the future
and thus obtain indirectly a result that it could not command directly." Id. at 509-
10.
49. Id. at 499-505.
50. Id. at 510.
51. Id. at 510; see also City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 1 Cal. 3d 527, 530 (Cal.
1982).
Maintenance of malicious prosecution actions by governmental
entities would generate a potentially chilling effect of
considerable dimension upon the exercise of the right to petition
the government through the courts for redress of grievances.
Therefore, constitutional principles and tort principles combine to
make the existence of a malicious prosecution action
inappropriate.
Id.
52. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (reserving the question whether
violation of the First Amendment by a federal agent acting under color of law gives
rights to a cause of action for damages).
53. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
In Bivens, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics carried out a
warrantless search of the petitioner's home for alleged narcotics
violations.54  Afterwards, Bivens was taken into custody,
interrogated, and subjected to a strip search.55 The Court established
a cause of action for those whose First Amendment rights had been
violated by federal agents.56 Furthermore, Bivens also provided
damages for those whose constitutional violations occurred at the
hands of federal agents. 57
When it comes to government and state actors, if the plaintiff
could point to a law or guideline imposed by the government or state
actor which directly hinders, limits or prevents ones' abilities to carry
out or engage in constitutionally protected freedoms, it could be
incontestably argued that such an actor had infringed upon First
Amendment rights of the plaintiff.5 8 A claim that the government or
state actor merely retaliated in some way against one who exercised
their First Amendment rights, however, needs to be proven with more
particularity.5 9
The starting point for inquiries into claims for retaliatory actions
was the common law of torts because the earliest cases in which
public employees claimed that they were fired for speech did not
specifically address what the plaintiff needed to prove and plead.6 °
Generally, it was held that the plaintiff must be able to show that the
government or state actor took retaliatory action against them in
54. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 397. "When vengeful officer is federal, he is subject to action for
damages on the authority of Bivens." Id.
57. Id. at 397.
58. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10 (1980).
59. See Boger v. Wayne County, 950 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing the
prima facie elements a plaintiff must allege in a retaliatory action).
60. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978)).
Over the centuries the common law of torts has developed a set
of rules to implement the principle that a person should be
compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his
legal rights. These rules, defining the elements of damages and
the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the appropriate
starting point for the inquiry under section 1983 as well.
Id. at 483.
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direct response to their exercise of constitutional rights. 61
Specifically, to establish a prima facie case for a claim alleging such
a retaliatory action the plaintiff must prove: (1) the speech in
question is related to a matter of public concern; (2) their interest in
making the statement outweighs their employer's interest in
promoting efficiency in its operations; and (3) the protected speech
was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to penalize the
plaintiff.62 If the alleged retaliation is said to take the form of a
malicious prosecution, then the plaintiff must allege a deprivation of
a constitution right in addition to these common-law elements. 63
In a context where retaliatory action takes the form of criminal
prosecution, all circuits have established that the plaintiff must
demonstrate at least the three following elements to complete their
prima facie case: (1) they were engaged in a constitutionally
protected activity; (2) the defendant's actions caused them to suffer
an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) the defendant's adverse
actions were substantially motivated against the plaintiff's exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct. 64
Retaliation causes of action were also considered subject to
recovery pending demonstration of a causal connection between the
official action offending the Constitution, and the resulting
deprivation of a constitutional right.65 In Mt. Healthy City Board of
Education v. Doyle, the Supreme Court articulated that a plaintiff
must prove a causal connection between the defendant's retaliatory
animus and the subsequent injury in any retaliation action.66 In
61. Id. at 322.
62. Id
63. Johnson v. La. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
"if the First Amendment protects against malicious prosecution, [the plaintiff] must
not only allege a deprivation of a constitutional right, but must also establish all of
the elements of the common law tort action"). Id.
64. Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Crawford-
El v. Britton, 523 US 574 (1997) (prohibiting government officials from subjecting
an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions for speaking
out).
65. See Crawford, 523 U.S. at 588. "Bare allegations of malice would not
suffice to establish a constitutional claim . . . there must also be evidence of
causation." Id.
66. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 274.
Doyle, a teacher sent a copy of the school board's dress code for
teachers to a local radio station.67  When the school board
subsequently refused to renew his contract, he claimed their actions
violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.68 The school board defended their
actions claiming they had valid reasons to dismiss the teacher despite
his exercise of free speech - namely, because the teacher not only
demonstrated bad tact in sending the memorandum to the radio
station, but also because he had been witnessed making obscene
gestures to students.69
The Court stated that once the plaintiff was able to establish the
common-law elements of a retaliatory action or prosecution claim,
the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that there were
other reasons for its adverse action and that it would have taken the
same action even if the employee had not spoken.70  Thus, if the
school board could demonstrate that they indeed had a valid reason
for not renewing Doyle's contract (that there was probable cause), it
67. Id. at 276.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 283.
"That question of whether speech of a government employee is
constitutionally protected expression necessarily entails striking
"a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."
Id. at 284 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (1968)).
70. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287. (holding that causation must be established under
the "but-for" test demonstrating but for the free speech, the retaliatory action would
not have been taken); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282 (2nd Cir. 2003)
(Illustrating the burden shifting framework that applies to First Amendment claims for
retaliatory actions). In Coughlin, a prisoner alleged that correctional officers
"violated his civil rights and retaliated against him in violation of his First
Amendment rights by filing false disciplinary infraction charges against him." Id.
at 287-88. Summary judgment was given to the officers upon the court's finding
that "even if [the prisoner] established a prima facie case of retaliation with respect
to [one of the officers], his cause of action would [have] fail[ed] because the
retaliatory action, a disciplinary hearing and possible physical assault, would have
occurred regardless of the existence of a possible retaliatory motive." Id. at 288.
In other words, the court recognized that the defendants (officers) had
demonstrated probable cause for their actions and thus met the burden upon them
to defeat a prima facie retaliatory prosecution claim.
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does not matter if they were partially motivated by his speaking out
against the school dress code to the radio station, the plaintiff would
still not be able to make a prima facie case for retaliatory action
against the school board because his exercise of his First Amendment
rights was not the direct cause of the school board's actions. 7'
Though the path leading up to the Hartman decision was a
winding one, from the onset of the Court's consideration in the
Hartman case, it was firmly agreed upon by all circuits that the
common law elements articulated in Tejeda must be established in a
context where retaliatory action takes the form of criminal
prosecution. 72  However, because there has been a division among
those same courts on the issue of whether or not a showing of a lack
of probable cause needs to be demonstrated as well, it was left
unclear if the common law elements were all that a plaintiff needed
to establish in order to have a complete prima facie case. 73  The
Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh circuits mandate that the
plaintiff prove an additional fourth requirement: an absence of
probable cause to prosecute.74 The Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits
in addition to the D.C. Circuit, do not require a lack of probable
cause to prosecute in a claim for retaliatory criminal prosecution. 75
In Kerr v. Lyford, the Fifth Circuit defined probable cause as "the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.,76 The belief must be in the mind of a reasonable person
71. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 286-87.
72. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
73. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 286-87; see also Tejeda, 290 F.3d at 260-61 (holding
the absence of probable cause is an element that must be demonstrated by a
plaintiff claiming retaliatory prosecution violated his constitutional rights).
74. 1 STETON HALL CIR. REv 147, 161 (Spring 2005) (discussing elements of
a retaliatory prosecution claim).
75. Id. at 161. This split among the circuits illuminates the inquiry: "exactly
what instructions would the USPS give to its inspectors under these circumstances?
And would they be required to conduct their investigations differently in each
Circuit? At the very least this illustrates the need for direction from the Supreme
Court." Miles Norton, Legal Information Institute Bulletin: Supreme Court Oral
Argument Previews, available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/04-
1495.html.
76. Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Moore v.
McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994)).
who would act on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor in
a fashion similar to, if not identical to, the manner in which the given
prosecutor acted."
As of the date of the Hartman decision - January 10, 2006 - the
law applicable to establishing a cause of action for retaliatory
prosecution was that a plaintiff must illustrate: (1) they were engaged
in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) the defendant's actions
caused them to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; (3) the
defendant's adverse actions were substantially motivated against the
plaintiffs exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. 78 A fourth
element, (4) that the defendant acted with a lack of probable cause,
was sometimes included depending upon which jurisdiction the claim
was initiated in.79
III. FACTS
During the 1980's, Williman G. Moore, Jr. served as the chief
executive of Recognition Equipment Inc. ("REI").80  REI
manufactured a multiline optical character reader for interpreting
multiple lines of text, which the United States Postal Service
("USPS") intended to utilize for reading and sorting mail. 81 The
USPS paid REI approximately fifty million to develop this
technology, meanwhile urging mailers to utilize full nine-digit zip
codes (instead of five-digit zip codes) that would permit REI's
machines to sort mail based on single-line scanning. 82
Members of Congress, Government research officers, and even
Moore himself voiced reservations about the nine-digit zip code
policy and the singe-line reading method proposed. 83 Specifically,
77. Id
78. Id
79. See supra notes 36 and 45.
80. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252 (2006).
81. Id
82. Id.
83. Id.at 252-53; see, e.g., Seaberry, Durenberger Begins Campaign Against
Nine-Digit Zip Code, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 24, 1981, at E4 (describing Senator
David Durenberger's reference to the Zip + 4 campaign as "'a mnemonic plague of
contagious digititous').
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they noted the burden put upon mailers to memorize a nine-digit zip
code and the estimation that it would cost the USPS an extra one
million a day to operate the single-line scanners as opposed to
multiline scanners.84
Though Moore was among those who stood to gain financially
from adoption of the new technology, he sought to convince the
USPS that the incorporation of multiline scanners would be better.85
His efforts included actively opposing the nine-digit policies enacted
by USPS to support the single-line readers, lobbying Congress to
oppose the policies by testifying before congressional committees,
and supporting a "Buy American" rider to the Postal Service's 1985
appropriations bill.86 Despite alleged requests from the Postmaster
General to be quiet, Moore pushed forward with anti-nine-digit zip
code efforts.87
In July of 1985, Moore's efforts saw success, as the USPS
embraced multiline rather than single-line technology. 88 Instead of
accepting the multiline equipment from REI however, the USPS
ordered between $ 250,000 and $400,000,000 of equipment from a
competing firm. 89
Shortly thereafter, Moore and REI were subject to two
investigations by Postal Service inspectors.90 Despite extremely
limited evidence linking Moore and REI to any wrongdoing, the
Assistant U.S. Attorney brought criminal charges against them in
1988. 9' Following a six week trial, the district court concluded there
84. Id. at 253.
85. Id
86. Id.
87. Id. Based on a recommendation by one of the Postal Service governors,
Peter Voss, Moore hired a public-relations firm for REI, Gnau and Associates, Inc.
("GAI") for REI. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The first investigator looked into purported kickback payments by
GAI to Governor Voss for Voss's recommendations of their services and the
second investigator sought to document REI's possible improper role in the search
for a new Postmaster General. Id.
91. Id. at 253-54.
was a "complete lack of direct evidence" and granted the REI
defendants' motion for judgment of acquittal.92
Once acquitted, Moore and REI filed a civil liability suit against
the prosecutor, who initiated the charges against them, and five postal
inspectors.93  Within his claims Moore asserted the defendants
engineered his criminal prosecution in retaliation for his lobbying
activities and public opposition to the USPS's proposed policies and
single-line equipment; retaliation which violates the First
Amendment. 94 Moreover, Moore alleged the defendants pressured
the United States Attorney's office to have him indicted. 95
Though Moore's claims against the prosecutor were ultimately
dismissed, his claims against the postal inspectors survived the
defendant's motions for summary judgment before both the district
court and court of appeals. 96 While the court of appeals was certain
in their ruling that the inspectors were not subject to qualified
immunity from a retaliatory prosecution suit, it was divided on the
issue of whether or not a lack of probable cause need be proven in a
claim brought under section 1983 (considered analogous to a Bivens
action) .9
92. Id. (citing United States v. Recognition Equip. Inc., 725 F. Supp. 587, 596
(D.C. Cir. 1989).).
93. Id. . Moore filed his claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
94. Hartman, 547 U.S. 250, 254 (2006).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 255. The District Court for the Northern District of Texas ultimately
dismissed the claims against the Assistant U.S. Attorney granting him absolute
immunity for prosecutorial judgment, in addition to rejecting abuse-of-process
claims against the prosecutors. Id. at 254-55. The remaining claims were
transferred to the District court for the District of Columbia where Moore's suit
was entirely dismissed. Id. at 255. Moore's retaliatory-prosecution claim was later
reinstated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. Upon
reinstatement of the claims, limited discovery was permitted as to the claims
against the postal inspectors; meanwhile charges against the United States and
prosecutor were again dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity. Id. Ultimately
the District of Columbia Circuit conclusively afforded the prosecutor immunity and
dismissed him from the case, while reinstating the claims against the United States,
and maintaining the claims against the postal inspectors. Id.
97. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) holding
[B]oth Bivens and § 1983 allow a plaintiff to seek money
damages from government officials who have violated [their
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Historically, some circuits have required the plaintiff to prove a
lack of probable cause in a retaliatory prosecution claim.
98
Meanwhile, other circuits have imposed no such burden. 99 To
resolve the split the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the lower court's ruling, holding that a plaintiff bringing a section
1983 claim under a Bivens action, must plead and prove a lack of
probable cause as a prima facie element of their claim.'
00
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion
Presenting the majority opinion, Justice Souter's argument first
illuminates the facts of the case, briefly addresses the lower court's
decisions, and then recognizes the underlying constitutional issues
forming the basis of a retaliatory prosecution claim.10' Second, he
highlights the division among the lower courts as to the necessary
elements of a retaliatory prosecution claim and acknowledges the
constitutional] rights. But government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified
immunity and are "shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.
Id. at 609.
98. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 255-56; see, e.g., Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363 (5th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 883 (11 th Cir. 2003);
Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 2002); Singer v. Fulton County
Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 1995); Post v. Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552 (1 1th
Cir. 1993); Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (2nd Cir. 1992);
Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918 F.2d 364 (2nd Cir. 1990); Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330,
340 (5th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. La. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 318, 320 (5th Cir.
1994).
99. Hartman, 547 U.S.. at 255-56; see, e.g., Poole v. County of Otero, 271
F.3d 955, 961 (10th Cir. 2001); Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1256-57
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
100. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 255-66.
101. Id. at 252-60. The court noted the divide among the circuits with respect
to the pleading requirements of retaliatory prosecution suits. See supra notes 66-67
and accompanying text.
precedent leading up to the Hartman decision.° 2 Third, he discusses
the issues present in Hartman that have not been resolved in the
Court's previous decisions regarding what needs to be pleaded by a
plaintiff bringing a retaliatory prosecution claim of any sort,
specifically, what a plaintiff needs to plead when bringing a
retaliatory prosecution claim in response to criminal charges.' 0 3
Lastly, after briefly addressing the absolute immunity given to
prosecutors, Justice Souter elaborates on the significance of a
plaintiff being able to demonstrate the absence of probable cause
when bringing a retaliatory prosecution cause of action.0 4
Justice Souter first notes the rights provided by the First
Amendment serve as the underlying foundation for the prohibition of
retaliatory actions - including criminal prosecutions - imposed upon
individuals by government officials.0 5 Specifically, he notes that the
First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting
individuals to retaliatory actions for exercising their constitutionally
protected right to free speech.'0 6
For centuries courts have enforced the protection of First
Amendment rights, holding that adverse action against government
employee's exercise of First Amendment freedoms, i.e. speech, is
impermissible. 1°7 Furthermore, he notes "when the vengeful officer
uis federal, he [has been] subject to an action for damages on the
authority of Bivens" since 1971. 108
Despite the well-established fact that retaliatory actions taken by
both federal and state officials are subject to constitutional scrutiny,
102. Id. at 258-59.
103. Id. at 258-65.
104. Id. at 260-66.
105. Id. at 256 (citing Crawford-E v. Brittonl, 523 US at 574, 593 (1998)
(holding retaliation is subject to recovery as the but-for cause of official action
offending the Constitution)). See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 247, 283-
84(1998)); see also Stephen L. Hayford, First Amendment Rights of Government
Employees: A Primer for Public Officials, 45 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 240, 241-48 (Jan.
- Feb. 1985) (addressing the fact that the Supreme Court decisions have
consistently established personnel actions in government organizations must be
"fashioned in a manner which respects [the] First Amendment rights of public
employees").
108. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).
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Justice Souter notes that the issue of what a plaintiff, in bringing such
a cause of action, must plead when the retaliatory action includes the
pressing of underlying criminal charges, is one that had yet to be
settled prior to Hartman.1"9 While Moore and REI argued that the
issue of probable cause was an evidentiary matter, the defendants
argued: (1) there needed to be an "objective" burden imposed on the
plaintiff to prevent the filing of frivolous lawsuits; and (2) the
traditional tort of malicious persecution illustrates what the
"objective requirement" should be: a lack of probable cause for
charging the crime to being with. 10
While noting that there was some merit in the contention that an
objective fact requirement should be included in cases involving
retaliatory-criminal prosecutions, Justice Souter briefly turned to a
discussion of the elements of common-law tort actions for
constitutional violations.11" ' Concluding the common law of torts
109. Id. at 255-57. In addition to noting the split among the circuits as to
pleading requirements, Justice Souter pays particular attention to what each of the
parties in Hartman argue, with respect to the necessary elements of a retaliatory-
prosecution claim. Id. at 256-58. In Hartman, Moore and REI contended (in
accord with the court of appeals) that the issue of probable cause was "an
evidentiary matter going to entitlement in fact" while the defendant inspectors
argued that an absence of probable cause should be considered an essential
element. Id. at 257-58. Arguing the possibility of a slippery slope if cases were
permitted to go forward without the additional element of probable cause having
been established, the defendants noted the 2004 case of National Archives and
Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 175, which stated allegations of
government misconduct are "easy to allege and hard to disprove." Id. at 257 (citing
Brief of Petitioners at 21-23).
110. Id. at 257-58.
111. Id. at 258. Though he agreed initially that it was a fair argument that
there needs be an objective fact requirement in retaliatory-prosecution cases,
Justice Souter also noted that the objective fact requirement suggested by the
defendants was not conclusive. Id. The defendants suggested that "the traditional
tort of malicious prosecution's requirement that a plaintiff must show the criminal
action in question was begun without probable cause for charging the crime in the
first place." Id. at 257-58. Justice Souter considered the arguments that the
objective fact requirement applied in a retaliatory-prosecutions should reflect the
traditional abuse of process case (and exclude an no-probable cause element). Id.
at 258. While the defendants could point to precedent addressing the issue of what
a plaintiff needs to prove in a retaliatory prosecution, Justice Souter noted "there is
no disproportion of [precedent] the [does] not require showing an absence of
probable cause. Id. 258-59.
were merely inspired examples rather then concrete components of
what should comprise the components of retaliatory prosecution
claim, he concluded it would be a futile debate to rely upon common-
law parallels to justify a no-probable cause requirement." 2 Rather
than reliance upon common-law principles, Justice Souter states it is
the need to prove a chain of causation from animus to injury that
provides the strongest justification for imposing a fourth, no-probable
cause, element upon the plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution case.113
Acknowledging that a causal connection between the defendant's
animus and the plaintiffs injury necessarily be shown in any type of
retaliation action, Justice Souter distinguishes the retaliation-
prosecution action like that in Hartman, from other retaliatory
actions. Justice Souter reasons that within retaliation-prosecution
actions the animus harboring individual is not the individual
allegedly taking the adverse action.' 14 Upon a showing of but-for
112. Id. at 258.
113. Id. at 259. Justice Souter argues that "details specific to retaliatory-
prosecution cases" were necessary to establish the chain of causation sufficient to
support a retaliatory-prosecution cause of action. Id.
114. Id. In ordinary retaliation claims the government agent "allegedly
harboring animus is also the individual taking the adverse actions." Id. In the
present case, Moore and REI allege the animus harboring individuals (the postal
inspectors), while "enginee[ring] his criminal prosecution," did not actually take
the adverse action of bringing charges against him, but instead pressured the United
States Attorney's office to have him indicted. Id. at 243-54. Thus the actual
adverse action (criminal charges) were brought by the Assistant United States
Attorney, and not animus harboring postal inspectors themselves. Id. at 259.
Justice Souter notes that the causation requirement in a case like this one "presents
an additional difficulty" in that there is a gap between the animus harboring
individual, and the adversely acting individual. Id. Justice Souter states that
causation in addition to proof of an improper motive is what needs to be proven to
establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 259-60. (citing Crawford-El, 523 US at
593). Ultimately, Justice Souter says, the simple "action colored by some degree of
bad motive" acceptable in cases like Crawford and Doyle is insufficient to
constitute a constitutional violation if that action would have been taken anyway (if
there was probable cause). Id. at 260. By acknowledging the gap between the
animus harboring individual and the adversely acting individual in cases like
Hartman, Justice Souter sets up the Court's discussion of the differences between
regular retaliation claims and that which involves retaliation in the form of criminal
charge for constitutionally protected conduct. Before getting to that discussion
however Justice Souter discusses the Pickering decision at length; illustrating that
precedent addressing retaliation claims does not address what a plaintiff explicitly
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causation Justice Souter argues there has been a prima-facie showing
of retaliatory harm that shifts the burden of proof to the defendant." 5
It thus becomes the defendant's burden to illustrate that absent
impetus to retaliate, the adverse action complained of would have
been taken anyway. 16 Absent a showing that the animus was the
but-for cause of the adverse action complained of, there is an
insufficient causal connection between the unconstitutional motive
and resulting harm. 17
Further distinguishing between regular retaliatory actions and
actions where the retaliation for protected conduct arises from a
criminal charge, Justice Souter finds that there are two main
differences that set a retaliatory prosecution case (like Hartman)
apart from a regular retaliation case.1 18 First, he says, "there will
always be distinct body of highly valuable circumstantial evidence
available and apt to prove or disprove retaliatory causation" in a
retaliatory prosecution case. 119 By demonstrating an absence of
probable cause for the underlying criminal charge, the plaintiff
reinforces the retaliation evidence and illustrates a but-for basis for
initiation of the prosecution which will support their prima-facie
case.12° In addition, if a defendant is able to illustrate the existence
of probable cause, they are able to demonstrate that the adverse
needs to plead and prove in regards to a connection between the retaliatory animus
and the discharge, "which will depend on the circumstances" he adds. Id. at 260.
115. Id. at 260.
116. Id.; see also Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 247, 287
(1998).
117. Id. at 260-61. "It may be dishonorable to act with an unconstitutional
motive and perhaps in some instances be unlawful but an action colored by some
degree of bad motive does not amount to an unconstitutional tort if that action
would have been taken anyway." Id. at 260.
118. Id. at 260-61.
119. Id. at 261. "[N]amely, evidence showing whether there was or was not
probable cause to bring the criminal charge" will be used to prove or disprove
retaliatory causation in retaliatory-prosecution cases. Id.
120. Id. at 260-61. Furthermore, Justice Souter claims, an absence of
probable cause "suggest[s] that prosecution would have occurred even without
retaliatory motive." Id. at 261.
action (criminal prosecution) would have occurred despite animus -
thus affirming the constitutionality of their actions.1
21
The second difference between regular retaliatory and retaliatory
prosecution cases Justice Souter points out is that, considering the
gap between the alleged person with animus and the actual actor who
carries out the adverse action, the requisite causation between the
animus and injury is more complex. 122 Necessitating a showing of a
lack of probable cause, Justice Souter argues, would better establish
the causal connection between the animus and the injury needed to
prove a constitutional violation against the non-acting, but animus-
harboring individual and the one whom they influence into carrying
out the adverse action complained of.123 As Justice Souter briefly
points out, to bridge the gap between the non-prosecuting, yet animus
121. Id. What Souter claims this first distinction between regular retaliatory,
and retaliatory-prosecution claims indicates is that "litigating probable cause will
be highly likely in any retaliatory-prosecution case, owing to it's power evidentiary
significance." Id.
122. Id. "A Bivens (or section 1983) action for retaliatory prosecution will not
be brought against the prosecutor (who is absolutely immune from liability for
decisions for prosecute.") Id. at 261-62. "Instead the defendant will be a non-
prosecutor, an official, like an inspector here, who may have influenced the
prosecutorial decision but did not he himself make it." Id. at 262. As Justice
Souter points out, when the defendant is a non-prosecutor who influenced the
decision to prosecute, the cause of action brought will not only be for retaliatory
prosecution, but also for the "successful retaliatory inducement to prosecute." Id.
It should be noted that though prosecutors are given absolute immunity for the
decision to bring charges, if the charges brought against the prosecutor surround
actions they carried out in their administrative capacities, absolute immunity is not
extended. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274-76 (1993) (holding no
absolute immunity when prosecutor acts in administrative capacity); see also Burns
v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, pincite? (1991) (holding "absolute immunity does not attach
when a prosecutor offers legal advice to the police").
123. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261-62. A signification point, only briefly
addressed by Souter, is the fact that not only does the demonstration of a lack of
probable cause help to fill in the causational gap, but it also circumvents the
absolute immunity given to the prosecutor in a way, by enabling the victim of
retaliatory-prosecution to bring a claim against the non-prosecutor, non-prosecution
bringing, but animus harboring individual who induced the prosecutor to bring
charges. Though the prosecutors themselves are given absolute immunity (based
on the presumption that a prosecutor has grounds for bringing charges), where the
causational gap is filled with a lack of probable cause on the part of the prosecution
inducing individual, the plaintiff is at least assured the ability to recover for their
injuries against the animus harboring individual.
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harboring actor and the actual prosecutor, it is not merely sufficient
to demonstrate that the "non-prosecuting official acted in retaliation,"
but also that "he induced the prosecutor to bring charges that would
not have been initiated without his urging."124 By analogizing the
Court's reasoning with Barts v. Joyner, Dellums v. Powell, and
Smiddy v. Varney, Justice Souter illustrates precedent supporting the
requirement of a causal connection between the retaliatory animus of
one person and the actions of another.' 25 He concludes that the
differences presented in cases where the claimed retaliatory action is
a criminal charge, as opposed to other forms of retaliation, support
the argument that a lack of probable cause should be alleged and
proven by the plaintiff.126
124. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262. "The causal connection required here is not
merely between the retaliatory animus of one person and that person's own
injurious action, but between the retaliatory animus of one person and the action of
another." Id; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (giving
absolute immunity to prosecutors).
125. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262-63. "In order to find that a defendant procured
a prosecution, the plaintiff must establish 'a chain of causation' linking the
defendant's actions with the initiation of criminal proceedings" Id. (citing Moore v.
Valder, 213 F.3d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); see also Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d
1187, 1195 (11 th Cir. 1989) (holding a plaintiff seeking damages incident to their
criminal prosecution must show the police, who allegedly violated their
constitutional rights, pressured or deceived prosecutors); Dellums v. Powell, 566
F.2d 167, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding where allegations of misconduct are
directed at police, a malicious-prosecution claim cannot stand if the decision made
by the prosecutor to bring criminal charges was independent of any pressure
exerted by the police in question ... need to bridge the gap between the acting
person and that harboring animus towards the plaintiff); Smiddy v. Varney, 665
F.2d 261, 267 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[W]here police officers do not act maliciously or
with reckless disregard for the rights of an arrested person, they are not liable for
damages suffered by the arrested person after a district attorney files charges unless
the presumption of independent judgment by the district attorney is rebutted.").
126. Hartman, 547 U.S.. at 262-63. "This discourse [in regard to the
complexity of filling in the gap in retaliatory prosecution cases where the animus
harboring individual is not the directly acting individual] appears to be consistent
with the principles announced in the governmental and supervisory liability cases."
Sheldon H. Nahmod, Michael L. Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Constitutional Torts
August 2006 Update, available at:
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/texts/pdf/ConstitutionalTorts.doc. See,
e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(requiring that the official policy or custom of a local government must be "the
moving force" behind its employee's unconstitutional action); see also City of
Moving to the core of the issue presented, Justice Souter uses the
remainder of the Court's opinion to elaborate on the significance of a
plaintiffs ability to demonstrate an absence of probable cause in a
retaliatory prosecution cause of action.'2 7 He adds, in addition to the
fact that in the present case the plaintiffs evidence of an inspector's
animus does not invariably imply the inspector induced the
prosecutor's actions in bringing criminal charges, there remains an
underlying presumption that a prosecutor has legitimate grounds for
bringing criminal charges, and this presumption is one not lightly
discarded. 128  Again, Justice Souter points to the plaintiffs
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Board of Commissioners of Bryan
County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (emphasizing plaintiffs must prove not only
that a local government's training and hiring policies are deliberately indifferent to
risk of violating the plaintiffs constitutional rights, but also that these deficient
policies "actually caused" and were the "moving force" behind the individual
officials' unconstitutional conduct - thus establishing a causal chain); Allen v. City
of Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997) (addressing causation in supervisory
liability cases). The common thread between the aforementioned cases and the
instant case (Hartman) is that in all these cases the defendant is alleged to have
done something that caused someone else to violate the plaintiffs constitutional
rights and the courts consistently held it is not enough for a plaintiff to prove that a
defendant engaged in culpable conduct and a constitutional violation occurred; the
plaintiff must also prove that the culpable conduct actually cause another else (i.e.
prosecutor) to violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
127. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262-66.
128. Id. at 263-64; see, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08
(1985) (holding prosecutorial discretion is broad, thus ill-suited to judicial review
in light of such factors as "the prosecution's general deterrence value, the
Government's enforcement priorities". . . the fact that "[e]xamining the basis of a
prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by
subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking [sic] to outside inquiry,
and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness"); see also Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 480-90 (1999). Given the judiciary's
broad deference to a prosecutor's decision whether or not to bring charges, the
question then becomes, how must deference is too much deference? The court
wants to uphold the effectiveness of the prosecutor, but at the expense of the
plaintiffs constitutional rights? Compare Wayte, 470 U.S. at, 607-08; Reno, 525
U.S. at 480-90 and Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265-66 with Lara Beth Sheer,
Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 Geo. L.J. 1353 (1998) (discussing the courts broad
recognition of prosecutorial discretion). "There are other limits to a prosecutor's
discretion, and the judiciary has a responsibility to protect individuals from
prosecutorial conduct that violates constitutional rights. Such conduct usually
involves either selective prosecution, which denies equal protection of the law, or
vindictive prosecution, which violates due process," Sheer at 1356-57; see also
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establishment of a lack of probable cause as sufficient to "address the
presumption of prosecutorial regularity."' 2 9
Though Justice Souter advocates there is a necessity for a
plaintiffs showing of a lack of probable cause, he does acknowledge
two possible but rare scenarios in which a plaintiff's showing of a
lack of probable cause would not be necessary. 30  First, he says,
where there is evidence that a prosecutor was "nothing but a rubber
stamp for his investigative staff or the police" that evidence would be
sufficient to establish a causal connection between retaliatory
thinking and the adverse act in question.' 3' Secondly, he notes that a
Sandra Caron George, Current Development 2004-2005: Prosecutorial Discretion:
What's Politics Got To Do with It? 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (Summer 2005)
(discussing the broad powers given prosecutors and the very real dangers of abuse
of that discretion).
129. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263 (arguing "at the trial stage, some evidence must
link the allegedly retaliatory official to a prosecutor whose action has injured the
plaintiff. The connection, to be alleged and shown, is the absence of probable
cause.") Justice Souter's main argument for requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a
lack of probable cause, regardless of the circumstance he is expanding upon,
centers around the fact that the gap between the adversely acting person and the
one with the actual animus in retaliatory-prosecution cases, and there is a causation
needed to bridge the gap, and rightly so, as this seems to be the foremost
justification for sustaining a no-probable cause requirement. Souter's opinion
seems to be redundant in that the majority of it is a repeated elaboration on why
requiring a demonstration of a lack of probable cause is necessary to cement the
causal chain between animus and adverse action. Despite this redundancy
however, Souter's approach to give a constitutional background and thoroughly
explain why the Supreme Court is setting this new precedent acts as a barriers to
future appeals of the issue that Souter attempts to ensure is "well-settled" by the
conclusion of the Hartman opinion. Compare Hartman, 547 U.S. 250 with
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (emphasizing "so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause, the charging decision is generally discretionary"
and sufficient " for a prima facie inference that the unconstitutionally motivated
inducement infected the prosecutor's decision to bring the charge") "Only in rare
cases can a court interfere with the government's decision to prosecute. For
example, where a decision to prosecute is based on a defendant's race, religion, or
decision to exercise a constitutional right, the courts must intercede." Gov't of the
Virgin Islands v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 409-10 (3rd Cir. 1995). See, e.g.,
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (reversing a conviction due to
retaliatory prosecution); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2nd Cir.
1974) (setting out the elements of a claim of discriminatory prosecution).
130. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264.
131. Id.; see, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 247, 281-
83 (1998) (holding evidence that the board of education, which formally decided
prosecutor's own disclosure of retaliatory thinking on his part would
be another significant factor in closing the gap between actor and
animus without the plaintiff's need to demonstrate a lack of probable
cause. 132
Justice Souter goes on to note, however, the likelihood of either
of these scenarios ever arising measures very low to non-existent.
33
It is "unrealistic" to expect either a prosecutor to reveal they harbored
animus in their minds when carrying out the prosecutions in question,
or to expect overwhelming evidence linking the animus harboring
individual with the adversely acting individual, such that causation
could be extended without presentation of a lack of probable
cause. 134  Because of the improbability of the aforementioned
scenarios, Justice Souter concludes that this is further support for the
not to rehire a teacher, after his exercise of protected speech, was only nominally
distinct from the school superintendent who was alleged to have bore the retaliatory
animus).
132. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264.
133. Id. To the Hartman plaintiff's arguments against a requirement of a non-
probable cause showing, Justice Souter points out while the abovementioned two
examples would indeed reduce if not eliminate the necessity for a plaintiff's ability
to show lack of probable cause, the fact that the circumstances surrounding such
examples are "likely to be rare" makes them "consequently poor guides in
structuring a cause of action" around them. Id. Souter makes a strong point here in
favor of the non-probable cause requirement by pointing out that the Supreme
Court in Hartman is establishing precedent to be followed closely by lower courts.
As such, it is important to establish a solid basis for the Court's ruling centered on
the circumstantial fact patterns most likely to arise, thereby making the ruling of
the Court most applicable. If the Court were to consider those rare instances in
which: (1) the adversely acting individual readily admits animus; or (2) evidence is
overwhelmingly substantial enough to infer a sufficient causal link, at the core of
their considerations around the structuring of a retaliatory-prosecution cause of
action, their holding would not be tailored in a manner rendering its applicability
generally effective.
134. Id. Justice Souter again considers the complexity of retaliatory-
prosecution in relation to other retaliation cases one factor lending to the
determination that the plaintiff be required to prove a lack of probable cause
because the complexity of retaliatory-prosecution cases further decreases the
chances that there will be a substantial amount of evidence sufficient to create the
required causal connection between animus and action without proof of non-
probable cause. Id. at 264-65.
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decision that proof of probable cause (or lack thereof), is essential to
retaliatory prosecution claims. 13
5
Taking all of his arguments into consideration: first a rejection of
the common law of torts as a guide to the Court's structuring of a
retaliatory prosecution cause of action; second, the differences
between other retaliation case and retaliatory prosecution cases
justifying a demonstration of no probable cause; and finally, the need
to structure a cause of action around likely scenarios so as to ensure
the effectiveness of the Court's ruling, Justice Souter asserts "the
significance of probable cause or the lack of it looms large, being a
potential feature of every case with obvious evidentiary value."' 36 It
is this "very significance" or probative value of probable cause
arising in "all cases", Justice Souter concludes, that necessitates the
requirement that it be plead and proven.137
B. Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer's Dissent
Recognizing that this case is now directed against the
instigating postal inspectors alone, not the prosecutor,
I would not assign to the plaintiff the burden of
pleading and proving the absence of probable cause
for the prosecution. Instead, in agreement with the
Court of Appeals, I would assign to the postal
inspectors who urged the prosecution the burden of
showing that, had there been no retaliatory motive and
135. Id.; see also id. at 258-59. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying
text. Contra infra note 120 and accompanying text.
136. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying
text, notes 98-101 and accompanying text, and note 112.
137. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265. Furthermore Justice Souter points out,
because the requirement to plead and prove the absence of probable cause (1) will
"usually be cost free by any incremental reckoning;" and (2) "can be made
mandatory with little or no added cost", it "makes sense to require such a showing
as an element of a plaintiffs case, and the court held that it must be pleaded and
proven." Id. Justice Souter lastly adds that "the issue [of probable cause] is so
likely to be raised by some party at some point that treating it as important enough
to be an element will be a way to address the issue of causation without adding to
time or expense." Id.
importuning, the U. S. Attorney's Office nonetheless
would have pursued the case.
138
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, considering the record from the
lower court and its finding that there was enough "evidence of
retaliatory motive coming close to the proverbial smoking gun,"
dissented from the majority's holding that a plaintiff must
demonstrate a lack of probable cause in a retaliatory prosecution
claim. 139 In agreement with the court of appeals they argued the
burden should shift to the defendants to show that they would have
pursued the prosecution of the plaintiff even without a retaliatory
motive. 140
Consequently, Ginsburg and Breyer articulate one severe
consequence of the majority's decision is that the plaintiff - "alleged
victim" - is unduly burdened; so much so, that "only entire baseless
prosecutions" would be checked. 1
41
Particularly, they argue the Hartman ruling implies that as long
as the defendants in a retaliatory prosecution claim are able to
demonstrate the smallest amount of probable cause, they may escape
liability and the victim would find no compensation for the economic
and reputational losses they have suffered. 1
42
Where the majority opinion recognized at least two instances in
which there would be no necessity for a plaintiff to demonstrate a
lack of probable cause, but concluded those two fact patterns were so
138. Id. at 266 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
139. Id. . Specifically Ginsburg noted that a review of the factual record
revealed clear evidence of "unusual prodding" and urging on the part of the
defendants in efforts to get a "reluctant U.S. Attorney's office to press charges
against Moore." Id. Essentially the dissent argues that such conduct, clearly
indicative of the defendant's influence in pressing charges, should not go
unheeded. It is clear evidence of unconstitutional conduct on behalf of the
defendants that should not be overridden by a small demonstration of probable
cause, rather a greater demonstration some other larger justification for their
actions (for example, a demonstration that there was in reality no retaliatory motive
for their actions). Id.
140. Id
141. Id. citing Moore v. Hartman, 388 F. 3d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
142. Id. In turn, the victim incurs "the cost entailed in mounting a defense"
along a reputational loss . . .neither of which would be compensable under the
federal law as defined by this decision in Hartman. Id.
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"rare" and "unlikely" that they should not be considered guides in
structuring a cause of action, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in their
dissent assert that even though the situations in which a discussion of
probable cause would not be necessary are "likely to be rare," it does
not justify "structuring a cause of action that precludes relief when
such instances] do arise." 143
Concurring with both the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit's opinion, and notably the Supreme Court's
opinion in Doyle, Ginsburg and Breyer conclude that a proper
balance between the burdens put on the plaintiff and defendant would
be better served by requiring the defendant to demonstrate: (1) there
was a lack of retaliatory motive; and (2) they would have pursued the
prosecution regardless of the presence of any retaliatory motive, in
order to successfully challenge a retaliatory prosecution cause of
action. 44
V. IMPACT
A. Legal Impact of the Hartman Decision
The issue before the Hartman Court was very straightforward:
whether a plaintiff in a Bivens action for retaliatory prosecution states
an actionable violation of the First Amendment without alleging an
absence of probable cause to support the underlying criminal charges
against them. 145 If you are of the majority opinion, the answer to this
inquiry would be "yes", particularly in light of the probative value
such a claim would have in establishing the requisite causation. 146
143. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 267.
Recovery remains possible . 'in those rare cases where strong
motive evidence combines with weak probable cause to support a
finding that the investigation and ensuing prosecution would not
have occurred but for the defending officials' retaliatory animus.'
That such situations 'are likely to be rare,' it seems to me, does
not warrant 'structuring a cause of action,' that precludes relief
when they do arise.
Id. (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 881); see also supra notes 109-13 and accompanying
text.
144. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 266-67; see also Mt. Healthy City Bd of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 247, 287 (1998).
145. Hartman, 547 at 252.
146. Id. at 252, 262-266.
Legally speaking, the holding of the Hartman Court is significant
for several reasons, the foremost being that it sets a new precedent in
its solidification of a fourth element in the structuring of a retaliatory
prosecution claim. 4 7 The Hartman Court recognized: (1) that they
were engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) the
defendants' actions caused them to suffer an injury that would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that
activity; and (3) the defendant's adverse actions were substantially
motivated against the plaintiffs' exercise of constitutionally protected
conduct. Further the Court said a plaintiff must also demonstrate that
the defendant acted with a lack of probable cause. 14 8
By adding an additional element to the prima facie case, the
Court effectively raises the burden of proof for the plaintiff in
retaliatory prosecution cases, thus making it harder to extend liability
to government actions, even in the face of a constitutional
violation. 149
The factual difficulty of divining the influence of an investigator
or other law enforcement officer upon the prosecutor's mind provides
an added legal obstacle in the longstanding presumption of immunity
already accorded to prosecutorial decision making, thus effectively
raising the burden of proof even higher. 5 ° Considering the complex
causal chain that already exists in retaliatory prosecution claims, the
holding of the Hartman Court piles one more hurdle upon several
inherently existent ones. 151
Because alleging ill-motive on the part of the prosecution is easy,
the Court considers having multiple filters preventing frivolous
147. See supra notes 36 and 45.
148. See supra notes 36 and 45.
149. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264-67.
150. Id. at 265-67. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
151 Hartman, 547 at 263-65. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
The fact that the causal connection isn't only between retaliatory animus of one
person and their injurious action, but between the retaliatory animus of one person
and the action of another makes the causal chain in a retaliatory-prosecution action
an inherently complex one. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. The
problem within retaliatory-prosecution cases that the Hartman court tired to
specifically address is that evidence of an inspector's animus does not conclusively
show he induced the prosecutor who would have not pressed charges but for the
inducement, there needs to be more; and the Hartman court ruled a lack of probable
cause is that "something more".
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claims is essential to saving time and preventing unnecessary and
unwarranted burden upon the court system. 152 Requiring an absence
of probable cause in the plaintiffs prima facie case would provide
one such filter. Without such precautions, the Court has been
concerned that any claim of retaliatory prosecution could essentially
subject prosecutorial decision-making to extensive discovery, which
the Supreme Court sought to avoid in cases like Wayte v. United
States and United States v. Armstrong.15
3
In Wayte the Court ruled that in a retaliatory prosecution claim
the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate: "(i) others similarly situated
generally had not been prosecuted for conduct similar to petitioner's
and (ii) the Government's discriminatory selection was based on
impermissible grounds such as race, religion, or exercise of First
Amendment rights." 154
Similarly, in Armstrong the Court held that for a claim of
prosecution violative of the constitution's equal protection clause, a
plaintiff must show "the prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory
effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose'
demonstrated when the claimant can show that similarly situated
individuals of a different race were not prosecuted." 155 The Court
concluded that one desired effect of these extra requirements
imposed upon the plaintiffs was that it "adequately balance[d] the
Government's interest in vigorous prosecution." 156
152. See supra note 115 and accompany text.
153. See Wayte, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); see also United States v. Armstrong
517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that an element of selective-prosecution claims
includes the defendant's production of some evidence of differential treatment of
similarly situated members of other races or protected classes [lack of probable
cause]).
154. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 605. These two requirements can be said to
translate into a showing of a lack of probable cause. "[S]o long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." Id at 607 (quoting
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). "This broad discretion rests
largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to
judicial review." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
155. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (citing Wayte 470 U.S. at 608).
156. Id. at 470. "The required threshold, a credible showing of different
treatment of similarly situated persons, adequately balances the Government's
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Wayte, Armstrong, and now
Hartman, the increased burden imposed upon plaintiff's in retaliatory
prosecution cases provides increased thresholds intended to protect
the presumption that prosecutors have legitimate grounds for their
decisions to prosecute. 157
B. Social Impact of the Hartman Decision
As to social impact, the Hartman rulings increased burden on
plaintiffs implies that it will be harder for individuals to successfully
bring retaliatory prosecution causes of action - even in the face of
constitutional violations. Though the constitution gives American
people the right to seek compensation for wrongs carried out against
them as a result of governmental action, that right becomes more and
more limited as the plaintiffs evidentiary burden is confounded by
multiple legal obstacles. 5
8
As noted by Justices Ginsburg and Bryer in their dissent, this
could provide a windfall for prosecutors (not subject to immunity), or
to those acting with retaliatory animus that are able to demonstrate
even the smallest amount of probable cause, thus defeating the
plaintiff's-now mandatory-claim of a complete lack of probable
cause. 159  Such a high standard would preclude relief in those
interest in vigorous prosecution and the defendant's interest in avoiding selective
prosecution." Id.
157. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263-65. See supra notes 107-08 and
accompanying text.
158. Wex, First Amendment: An Overview,
http://www.law.comell.edu/wex/index.php/First-amendment.
The right to petition the government for a redress of grievances
guarantees people the right to ask the government to provide
relief for a wrong through the courts (litigation) or other
governmental action. It works with the right of assembly by
allowing people to join together and seek change from the
government.
Id.
159. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265-67. "Under the Court's proof burden
allocation, which saddles plaintiff--the alleged victim--with the burden to plead and
prove lack of probable cause, only entirely "baseless prosecutions" would be
checked. So long as the retaliators present evidence barely sufficient to establish
probable cause and persuade a prosecutor to act on their thin information, they
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instances where the plaintiff is able to demonstrate a lack of probable
cause as long as the defendant is able to claim some form of probable
cause, even if it was coupled with animus and resulted in a
constitutional violation. 
160
Consequently, by increasing the evidentiary burdens placed upon
the plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution suit, animus harboring,
government actors may be afforded protection from liability for their
constitutional violations.161
VI. CONCLUSION
Ever since the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the First
Amendment has stood to provide that people would be secure in their
freedom to express themselves without interference or constraint
from congress. 62  Over time, the people's individual rights to
freedom of expression, speech, religion etc., remained so highly
regarded that liability for infringement of these freedoms was not
only extended to Congress, but to the federal government in its
entirety, as well as state and local governments. 63
From the government's perspective, expanding liability could
threaten to inhibit the manner in which a government actor carries
out their occupational duties, however, the Supreme Court early on
has taken precautions to protect against this possible chilling
effect. 164 Similarly, because retaliatory actions taken against one for
having exercised First Amendment freedoms has the very effect of
could accomplish their mission cost free." Id. at 266-67 (quoting Moore, 388 F. 3d
at 879).
160. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 266-67. Considering that the other three factors
required of a plaintiff for a successful prima-facie retaliatory-prosecution case are
arguably vague or subjective the plaintiffs hurdles to recovery in retaliatory-
prosecution cases seems mounting and almost limitless. This makes "advocates of
politically unpopular speech ...susceptible to expressly retaliatory prosecution,
provided the prosecutor could show some semblance of probable cause." Norton,
Legal Information Institute Bulletin: Supreme Court Oral Argument Previews
available at: http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/cert/04-1495.html.
161. Id.; see supra, notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. I
163. See supra notes 15, 19 and accompanying text.
164. See Sheer, ProsecutorialDiscretion, 86 Geo. L.J. 1353, 1356-57 (1998).
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chilling the people's exercise of those freedoms, courts have taken
precautions against this possible chilling effect as well.' 65
The Supreme Court in Hartman continued to pursue a balance
between the burden of proof allocated to the plaintiff in retaliatory
prosecution cases, alongside the check put on "baseless
prosecutions." '166 Because the balance articulated by the Hartman
Court resolved conflicts previously existing among the lower courts,
the holding provides a "balancing" that will be felt both legally and
socially - by the government, in it's increased security from liability
for First Amendment violating retaliatory prosecutions, and by the
individual, specifically as the evidentiary burden already upon their
shoulders has been increased.'67
To better understand the full effect of the Hartman decision,
imagine a case reflecting factual circumstance similar to that found in
Colson is sought post the Hartman decision: an elected official
alleges city officials falsely accused her of criminal acts, urged
prosecutors to investigate her, and took other retaliatory action
against her because she has publicly expressed political views they
contended with. 168  Prior to Hartman, courts considered only the
following three elements: (1) whether the speech in question is
165. See Colson, 174 F.3d. at 510. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying
text; see also Sheer, 86 Geo. L.J at 1356-57. "There are other limits to a
prosecutor's discretion, and the judiciary has a responsibility to protect individuals
from prosecutorial conduct that violates constitutional rights." Id.; see, e.g., U.S.
v. Redondo-Lemos, 27 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding the court has a duty
to closely scrutinize evidence of invidious discrimination where there is a claim of
retaliatory or vindictive prosecution); see also Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058,
1063-64 (10th Cir. 1995) (authorizing the federal court to enjoin pending state
criminal prosecutions under Younger abstention doctrine where prosecution was
"[c]ommenced in bad faith or to harass, based on flagrantly and patently
unconstitutional statute, or [related to] any other such extraordinary circumstance
creating threat of irreparable injury both great and immediate") (quoting Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
166. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 266-67 (quoting Moore, 388 F. 3d at 879).
167. Id. The Hartman decision can be said to give governmental actors
ipcreased security in their actions considering that the balance put more weight on
the plaintiff and less on the prosecution-seeking individual. Furthermore, even
where a plaintiff is able to meet the high standards imposed upon them,
government actors and other defendants are still able to avoid liability where they
can demonstrate even the smallest amount of non-animus driven probable cause.
168. See Colson, 174 F.3d. at 499-510.
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related to a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiffs'
interest in making the statement outweighs her employer's interest in
promoting efficiency in its operations; and (3) whether the protected
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to
penalize the plaintiff.169 Assuming the evidence indicates that the
plaintiffs speech in question was indeed a matter of public concern,
that the statements were not made in a manner that impeded the
efficiency of the defendant's operation and the defendants admit they
took retaliatory actions against the plaintiff largely because they
disagreed with her political stance, then prior to Hartman, the
plaintiff would have successfully made a prima facie case for
retaliatory prosecution. If the fourth element articulated by Hartman
were now added to the same fact pattern and the court required the
plaintiff to demonstrate the defendants acted without probable cause
in addition to animus, the chances of a successful prima facie
retaliatory prosecution claim would be dramatically reduced because
as the Hartman court articulated: it is only when a retaliatory motive
(animus) is combined with an absence of probable cause that it is
sufficient to give the claim of retaliation some vitality. 7 °
Though as the Hartman court notes that it is "easy to allege ill-
motive against prosecution," it is similarly just as easy for retaliators
to present just enough evidence sufficient to establish probable cause;
and under the Hartman ruling, even if the plaintiff is able to
demonstrate some animus on the part of the defendants, a
demonstration of probable cause would be sufficient to overcome the
fact that they also acted with animus, thus insulating the defendant
from liability and giving the victim no compensation for the losses
that they have suffered.' 71
169. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-73.
170. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263-67. "'[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable
cause,' the charging decision is generally discretionary, and enough for a prima
facie inference that the unconstitutionally motivated inducement infected the
prosecutor's decision to bring the charge." Id. at 263-65 (citing Bordenkircher, 434
U.S. at 364).
171. See supra, note 115 and accompany text. While considering deference to
the legitimacy of a prosecutor's decision to bring charges, I would suggest
consideration of the First Circuit's ruling in Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.
2004) where it was held: "when making a determination regarding qualified [or
absolute] immunity [given to prosecutors], the totality of the circumstances must be
evaluated." Id. at 33. In Cox, the plaintiff was arrested after police consulted with
While the Court concluded that preservation of the underlying
presumption that a prosecutor has legitimate grounds to bring charges
is a duty that court "do[es] not lightly discard," it concurrently seems
as though it lowered the Court's duty to uphold the constitution and
its provision that all persons should be free to redress the government
of grievances.172
Consequently, the court left open the question of whether the
expense or other adverse consequences of a retaliatory investigation
would ever justify recognizing such an investigation as a distinct
constitutional violation even in the face of a demonstration of
probable cause. Where the courts in Pickering, Colson and Plati in
1968, 1999 and 2001 respectively articulated any form of retaliation
for one's exercise of their First Amendment rights constitutes an
infringement of those constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, and
because such an infringement directly contravenes the Constitution,
courts should seek to compensate those injuries suffered wherever
possible. By 2006, the Hartman Court had come to consider the need
the Assistant District Attorney to determine probable cause. Id. Essentially the
officers there tried to claim they had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because
they had talked to the District Attorney, and where a prosecutor believes there is
probable cause, others have reason to defer to their judgment. See id. The court
cautioned that "a wave of the prosecutor's wand cannot magically transform an
unreasonable probable cause determination into a reasonable one." Id. at 34. Thus
the court noted that though prosecutor's are given deference alongside a
presumption of validity in their decisions to prosecute, this does not mean their
decisions should always be taken at face value without deeper consideration.
172. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263-66. See supra note 103 and accompanying
text. It was the court's position that concern for judicial intrusion into executive
distraction was of such a high order, it should be minimal. Id. at 263-65; see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Lara Beth Sheer, Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 Geo. L.J.
1353 (1998) (discussing the court's recognition of "a prosecutor's broad discretion
to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions, in part out of regard for the separation
of powers doctrine and in part because 'the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-
suited to judicial review') (quoting Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)); see
also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (holding broad
discretion is appropriate because prosecutors, not courts, must evaluate the strength
of a case, allocation of resources, and enforcement priorities); U.S. v. Tucker, 78
F.3d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1996) (Attorney General's exercise of discretion to refer
matters to Office of Independent Counsel for investigation and prosecution not
subject to judicial review); U.S. v. Bauer, 75 F.3d 1366, 1376 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discretion beyond judicial review unless defendants make prima facie showing
that decision rested on impermissible basis).
Fall 2007 Redressing the Balance
722 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-2
to appropriately balance the constitutional rights of the individual
with the need to protect the prosecutor's discretion in choosing to
bring charges. Moreover the Hartman Court stopped adding a fourth
element to retaliatory prosecution claims. Thus, only the future will
tell if a redressing of the "balance" to once again recognize the need
to compensate the harm an individual suffers when their
constitutional rights are infringed is appropriate. 7 3
173. Plati, 258 F.3d at 1175-79 (citing Henry, 219 f.3d at 1212); Colson, 174
F.3d at 508; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565.
